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The simultaneous expansion of employer-sponsored "fringe benefits" and of
government welfare programs in the post-World War II period created what
might be termed a "public-private welfare state" in the United States. These
developments were continuous with the public-private partnership that had
characterized American welfare provision since the nineteenth century. But the
increased range and scope of benefits, both public and private, in the postwar
period made them an intrinsic part of Americans' way of life and their sense of
well-being-that is, of their social citizenship.'
Feminist political theorists often point out that social citizenship is highly
inflected by gender; citizens usually gain entitlements and benefits based on sex
or on types of status that are gender-related, such as employment, military
service, and motherhood.2 This paper seeks to explore how differences in social
citizenship play out in a public-private welfare state, where benefits are
predicated, at least in part, upon private employment. I do this by analyzing the
treatment of motherhood (the benefits accruing to women as mothers) in such a
dual state during its formative period, using the provision of childcare as a
marker of women's status and entitlements within the public and private spheres.
In modem industrial societies, childcare is an essential element of social
citizenship for women, for it allows them to participate in the labor force on an
equal footing with men. (I should note that it is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for economic gender equality; equal access to education and training,
non-discriminatory hiring and employment conditions, and wage equity are also
essential.) Thus this article will examine and compare childcare provisions in the
public and private sectors of the postwar American welfare state.
My article focuses on two simultaneous developments in the area of
childcare policy that reveal quite clearly the workings of the public-private state
and its effects on women and gender relations: a sharp growth in private-sector
childcare services, and the shift from welfare to "workfare" (the campaign to
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move women from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to paid
employment), both of which began in the 1960s. The impact on motherhood of
these two types of developments was sharply differentiated by class/employment
status and, to an extent, also by race. While certain groups of employee mothers
(those deemed most valuable by corporations-not all working mothers) could
take advantage of high-quality, employer-sponsored childcare programs and
other benefits designed to ease conflicts between work and family, or could
readily purchase childcare services in the marketplace, AFDC mothers were
increasingly confronted with mandates to find work, even in the absence of
decent childcare or other provisions.
This paper has two theoretical starting points: Barbara Nelson's model of the
two-channel welfare state, and Gosta Esping-Andersen's tripartite typology of
welfare state regimes. I will explain how each of these theories contributes to my
analysis.
Nelson's model emerged from her study of the development of the American
welfare state during the Progressive Era. She has argued that the welfare state at
that time was divided into two streams or channels, one male, one female. In the
male channel, benefits were conferred on the basis of labor force participation;
they were, on the whole, characterized by generosity and rarely means-tested.
This meant that recipients, though clients of the government retained their
dignity and sense of independence-of having contributed to and thus "earned"
their benefits, which included such entitlements as workmen's compensation and
soldier's pensions. In the female stream, by contrast, benefits were conferred on
the basis of a relationship of dependency or caretaking-that is, by virtue of the
fact that the recipient was either the wife or child of a (male) wage-earner, and/or
the mother of children. Such benefits were characterized by a lack of generosity,
were usually means-tested, and often involved ongoing surveillance and moral
judgments on the part of social workers or bureaucrats. Such benefits included
military survivors' pensions or, later, widows' or mothers' pensions, the
forerunners of Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Together, these
different sets of benefits constituted what Nelson calls the two-channel welfare
state, one conferring dignity and entitlement on its clients, the other stigmatizing
them and keeping them on short rations. Both channels are marked by gender.
3
Nelson's model aptly describes the American welfare state as it emerged
during the Progressive Era and continued through the 1920s. But in the 1930s
and 1940s two major changes occurred. First, New Deal legislation-the Social
Security Act-subdivided the female channel by distinguishing between two
groups of women. The first group included widows who would received non-
means-tested Survivors' Insurance based on their husbands' employment
records; the second group was comprised of women whose husbands were not
3. See Barbara Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Worlanen s Compensation and
Mothers'Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 125-51 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990).
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covered by Social Security or who had never married in the first place, some of
whom now became eligible for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), a means-
tested program that carried much of the stigma of earlier mothers' pension
policy. Second, employment patterns during and after World War Hl eroded the
fundamental gender premises underlying Nelson's model-namely, the social
division between male breadwinners and female housewives and mothers-as
increasing numbers of wives and mothers entered the labor force.
How did these changes affect women's relationship to the welfare state?
Answering this question brings me to my second starting point, the typology of
welfare-state regimes set out by Gosta Esping-Andersen in his influential book,
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.4 According to Esping-Andersen,
modem welfare-state regimes cluster around three types: liberal, corporatist, and
social democratic, with the United States falling into the category of liberal.
Social provision in this type of welfare state is characterized by a public-private
partnership. According to Esping-Andersen, "The state encourages the market,
either passively-by guaranteeing a minimum--or actively, by subsidizing
private welfare schemes," to offer benefits that would likely be provided by the
state itself in other types of welfare-state regimes.5 While such a pattern had been
apparent in the United States since the late nineteenth century, it became
increasingly significant after World War II, as businesses, largely at the behest of
organized labor, established benefit schemes on a broad scale, taking up an
increasing share of social welfare provision and at the same time extending the
reach of the American public-private welfare state.6
If we overlay Nelson's model with Esping-Andersen's, we see an important
modification for the postwar period: Many of the benefits that Nelson located in
the male channel of the public welfare state-that is, benefits conferred on the
basis of employment status-are now located in the private sector of the welfare
state, with the result that the male channel and the private sector increasingly
coincide. At the same time, however, we see that Nelson's strict gender scheme
no longer holds up; with women in the labor force, there are now women on both
sides of the public-private divide-as workers and as the dependents of workers
and/or as mothers.
Our question now becomes, how do women, particularly mothers, fare in this
new system of social provision? Where do women look for needed services?
How responsive is the private sector to the needs of female wage-eamers, and
how effective are women in shaping the benefit "packages" available to them?
How does the rise in female labor force participation, particularly among
4. GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990).
S. See id. at 26-27.
6. See generally BETH STEVENS, COMPLEMEmG THE WELFARE STATE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRIVATE PENSION, HEALTH INSURANCE, AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (1986)
(providing a history of this period).
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mothers of small children, affect the basis for entitlement and the types of
services available in the public sector? To what extent do public provisions
complement or compensate for private benefits? Do women have more or less
purchase on social entitlements in this bi-gendered public-private welfare state?
CHILDCARE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Provision of childcare has, throughout American history, been sporadic and
inadequate. Until the Depression and World War HI, most services were offered
through the private sector-not by businesses, however, but by philanthropic
organizations. Under the New Deal, the federal government sponsored childcare
through the WPA's Emergency Nursery Schools program, and during World War
1I, after much debate, it finally established childcare centers under the provisions
of the Lanham Act . Federal childcare programs did not emerge as an immediate
and unequivocal response to the presence of women in the labor force or even to
wartime labor demands, but as the result of often tortured and polarized
discussions about the role of women in society and particularly about children's
needs and mothers' responsibilities.
These discussions notwithstanding, more mothers entered the labor force
during World War II than ever before in American history and, after a brief
postwar dip, the trend continued. The number of mothers of children under
eighteen who were employed rose from about ten percent in 1950 to over thirty
percent by 1962-a total of nine million women. More than a third of these
wage-earning mothers (3.3 million) had children under age six. One fifth of the
mothers with children under three were employed, and in solo-mother
households, the proportion was as high as one-third. 9
Continuing high levels of maternal employment prompted a general
discussion about whether or not mothers should work, a discussion that resolved
itself in a split based on class (and, implicitly, race).'0 Public opinion condoned
employment for middle-class mothers who could find adequate childcare or
arrange their working hours to coincide with school hours, the main idea being
that such women were entitled to self-fulfillment but should not permit
employment to conflict with or take priority over their responsibilities to their
children. Public opinion also condoned employment for working-class mothers,
but on distinctly different grounds. These women needed to work in order to
7. See generally MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE
IN AMERICA (1986).
8. See SONYA MICHEL, CHILDREN'S INTEREsTS I MOTHERS' RIGHTS: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA'S CHILD
CARE POLICY (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 224-83, on file with author).
9. Five and a half million working mothers had children ages 6 to 18. See Seth Low, Child Welfare
Services, 1962-Their Range and Extent, WELFARE IN REV., July 1963, at 10, 15; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102ND CONG., 1994 GREEN BOOK: OvERViEw OF
ENTITEMENT PROGRAMS 553 (Comm. Print 1994).
10. The following discussion is drawn from MICHEL, supra note 8 (manuscript at 284-368, on file with
author).
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raise and maintain their families' standard of living and, in extreme cases, keep
their families off the welfare rolls. Thus while paid employment was regarded as
optional for middle-class mothers, it was virtually mandatory for those who were
low-income and working-class, especially women of color.
The class and racial split carried over to discussions of governmental support
for childcare. By the early 1960s the issue of childcare was receiving more
national attention than at any time since World War IL largely due to the efforts
of a growing national childcare movement.' Moving cautiously, this movement
refrained from endorsing matemal employment unconditionally, nor did it
demand federal support for childcare services. Instead, movement leaders took
the position that many mothers had to work out of financial need, and that in
those cases "the local community" should see to it that childcare was provided.
This guarded and class-divided position precluded the possibility of claiming a
universal right to childcare guaranteed by the federal government. It did,
however, open the way for a major shift in public policy toward low-income
women.
In 1960 the childcare movement, in conjunction with several federal
agencies, held a national conference on childcare, to which President-elect John
F. Kennedy sent a striking message:
We must have provision for day care centers for children whose
mothers are unavailable during the day. Without adequate day time care
during their most formative years the children of the nation risk
permanent damage to their emotional and moral character.... I believe
we must take further steps to encourage day care programs that will
protect our children and provide them with a basis for a full life in later
years. The suggestion of a program of research, financing, and
development to serve the children of working mothers and of parents
who for one reason or another cannot provide adequate care during the
day deserves our full support.12
Kennedy's message seemed to promise a broad-based commitment by the federal
government to childcare for families from all class backgrounds. But, as we shall
see, this did not materialize in actual policy. Class and racial divisions in public
attitudes toward maternal employment as well as within policy-making circles
prevented a universalistic position on childcare from gaining hegemony. Instead,
narrowly delimited childcare provisions became part of an overall program to
11. See id. (manuscript at 369-461, on file with author).
12. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PUB. No. 281, DAY CARE SERVIcES: FORM AND
SUBSTANCE 13-14 (Gertrude L. Hoffman ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
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reduce welfare rolls by using workfare to rehabilitate recipients and make them
financially independent.13
This program was embodied in two key pieces of legislation: the Social
Security Amendments of 1962 and 1967. The 1962 bill aimed at "rehabilitating"
AFDC recipients so that they would become self-sufficient by requiring that they
either seek work or enter job training programs.' 4 Mothers of preschool children
were explicitly exempted from the requirement, though the bill did provide block
grants to create childcare intended to encourage mothers who were current or
potential AFDC recipients to seek work or training. The 1967 bill, which
established the Work Incentive or WIN program, was somewhat more coercive
with regard to mothers. 15 Under WIN, states had the option of "referring" to job
programs mothers of children under six (or even under three, if they chose),
provided childcare was available.
These two bills signaled a distinct shift from previous government policy
toward low-income mothers, which had operated on the principle that mothers
belonged at home taking care of their children. This principle was embodied in
the mothers' and widows' pension legislation passed during the Progressive Era
(the major component of Nelson's "female channel"), and became federal policy
during the 1930s when mothers' and widows' pensions were transformed by the
Social Security Act.
The incorporation of mothers' pensions into Social Security had mixed
implications for low-income and solo mothers. On the one hand, it attempted to
eliminate some-though not all-of the inequalities and variations that had
characterized state-level pension policies. 16 On the other hand, Social Security
became the Trojan Horse that introduced into American social provision a highly
discriminatory, two-tiered system that skimmed off one group of women for non-
means-tested benefits under Survivors' Insurance while subjecting the remainder
to the scrutiny and surveillance that accompanied ADC. 17 The first group
consisted of the widows of workers-mainly white men-who had been
employed in "covered" occupations, while the second comprised widows of
"non-covered" workers (mainly African-American men), plus women who were
divorced, deserted, never-married, etc. Whereas widows had made up about
three-quarters of those covered by state pensions, they numbered less than ten
percent of those on ADC. Without the leavening of the "worthy" (white) widows
whose image had been used to gain legitimacy for mothers' pension policy, the
population of ADC recipients became stigmatized and politically vulnerable.
13. See NANCY E. ROSE, WORKFARE OR FAIR WORK: WOMEN, WELFARE, AND GOVERNMENT WORK
PROGRAMS 76-96 (1995).
14. See Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 172.
15. See Social Security Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 204, 81 Stat. 821 (1968).
16. See LINDA GORDON, PrITED BUT NOT ENTLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE
274-80 (1994).
17. See GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD: INEQUALITY IN THE WELFARE STATE, 1917-
1942, at 136-39 (1995).
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In addition to the formal, explicitly discriminatory features of the two-tiered
public assistance program, administrative practices of a discretionary and highly
arbitrary nature also penalized women of color. Southern states routinely
"cycled" African-American mothers on and off ADC by compelling them to take
low-wage jobs on a seasonal basis or disqualifying them outright on narrowly
technical grounds.' 8 Often they were barred from receiving benefits on the basis
of illegitimacy, which-according to officials-was incompatible with the
"suitable home" requirement. 19 Since non-married motherhood was more
common among blacks than whites (ranging around ten times greater between
1940 and 1960),20 more black women were excluded by this strict interpretation
of the policy.
The systematic exclusion of blacks from welfare had an important corollary:
it meant that black mothers continued (as they had since Emancipation) to
participate in the labor force at a higher rate than white mothers, regardless of
marital status. Moreover, black mothers, with few or no alternatives, could
seldom avoid being channeled into the lowest echelons of the employment
market. This pattern, in conjunction with the two-tiered federal policy, produced
a set of racially-bifurcated assumptions about solo motherhood: poor black
mothers of all classes were expected to work, while poor and middle-class white
mothers were not.2' Clearly, ADC did not apply equally to all solo mothers. For
poor black women a de facto form of workfare appears to have been built into
federal welfare policy from the very beginning.
22
It was not until the 1960s, however, that workfare for mothers was articulated
as an explicit policy goal. While the legislation was not race-specific on its face,
there are strong indications that its passage was racially motivated.23 The
immediate precipitants of workfare were twofold: a marked expansion of public
assistance, and changes in the racial composition of those receiving aid. Between
1940 and 1960, the number of ADC/AFDC recipients had grown by nearly one
million per decade (from 1.2 million in 1940 to 3.1 million in 1960), and the
cost had increased more than sevenfold (from just over $100 million in 1940 to
18. The best discussion of this is still FRANcEs Fox PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE
POOR (1971). See also Joel Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families With Dependent Childrn: The
Family SupportAct in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 487-88 (1987-1988).
19. See MNw, supra note 17, at 142-50. See also RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP, LI'LE SUSIE: SINGLE
PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE 37 (1992).
20. See Arthur A. Campbell & James D. Cowhig, The Incidence of Illegitimacy in the United States,
WELFTAE IN REV., May 1967, at 1, 5. They point out, however, that out-of-wedlock conception may have been
equally common among whites as blacks, but more white women had married by the time of birth. See id.; see
also SOLINGER, supra note 19, at 13-15.
21. Or, to use Denise Riley's terms, black women were "underfeminized" (that is, their maternal
responsibilities were denied), while white women were "overfeminized" (reduced to their maternal
responsibilities). See RILEY, AMI THAT NAME? (1988).
22. Black mothers also experienced discrimination in mothers' pension programs. See Joanne Lorraine
Goodwin, Gender, Politics and Welfare Reform: Mothers' Pensions in Chicago, 1900-1930, at 283, 288 (1991)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with Sarah Lawrence College).
23. See Handler, supra note 18, at 489-91.
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nearly a billion in 1960).24 In 1960 the Social Security Administration ruled that
illegitimacy could no longer be considered grounds for rejecting AFDC
applicants, opening the way for more blacks to receive benefits. By 1967 the
proportions had shifted from fourteen percent non-white to forty-six percent non-
white. 25 Seeking other ways to exclude blacks and non-married mothers (who
were closely linked in the minds of many legislators) from receiving benefits,
Congress hit upon the policy of workfare. In 1961 Representative Jamie Whitten,
a conservative Democrat from Mississippi, introduced the first bill requiring
welfare recipients to work.26 While this bill failed to pass that year, it signaled a
definite shift in Congressional mood, and the following year the first set of work
requirements for ADC (now AFDC) recipients was passed as an amendment to
the Social Security Act.
The 1962 amendment carried somewhat contradictory messages conceming
mothers, fathers, and employment. On the one hand, it underlined conventional
gender roles by exempting mothers of children under six from the work
requirement and offering benefits to families with unemployed fathers so that the
fathers could remain in the household. On the other hand, it granted money to
the states in the form of block grants (to be matched by state funds) for childcare
so that low-income mothers who were, had been, or might become welfare
recipients, would be encouraged to find work outside the home. Though it
stopped short of making work mandatory, this last provision did begin to erode
the social contract that, since the Progressive Era, had at least rhetorically
assured govemment support to women who remained at home to care for their
children.
In his enthusiastic endorsement of the bill, Abraham Ribicoff, Kennedy's
Secretary of HEW, clearly departed from the President's message to the childcare
conference, which had been held only two years earlier. By fastening federal
support for childcare to the goal of eliminating or reducing the need for public
assistance, the measure represented a betrayal--or at least a significant
narrowing--of Kennedy's more universal promise. At hearings on the bill,
Ribicoff, using the catchwords of the day, emphasized the need for self-
sufficiency and rehabilitation instead of relief.27 Some childcare advocates
24. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
STATEs 96 (1968). The exact figures were $133 million in 1940 and $994 million in 1960. After 1960 the
number of recipients rose even more steeply, from three million in 1960 to nine million in 1970, 10 million in
1971, and over II million by 1975. Thus the number tripled between 1960 and 1970; had the pace continued,
there would have been 19 million recipients by 1980, but it actually began to level off in 1972 and even
declined after 1975. See MNIDRED REIN, DILEMMAS OF WELFARE POLICY: WHY WORK STRATEGIES HAVEN'T
WORKED 3 (1982).
25. See MINK, supra note 17, at 182. The proportion of non-whites included both African-Americans
and other people of color. Those who were still rebuffed now turned to the burgeoning civil rights movement
for assistance with appeals and hearings, leading to a reversal in the racial balance among recipients.
26. See Michael K. Brown, Race in the American Welfare State: Reflections on Social Policy Since the
New Deal (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
27. See Public Welfare Amendments of"1962: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
87th Cong. 63 (1962) (statement of Abraham Ribicoft) [hereinafter 1962 Hearings]. Ribicoff later conceded
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believed that the bill, however limited, was valuable because at the very least it
provided a vehicle for putting childcare on the federal agenda and gaining public
funding for it.28 Others, however, feared that the very existence of day care
services might be used to pressure ADC mothers to take jobs. The latter group
proved to be the more prescient: instead of opening the way to universal
childcare, the 1962 amendments put federal welfare policy on the slippery slope
toward workfare.
29
Lawmakers claimed that the 1962 bill would reduce dependency by making
recipients self-sufficient. Between 1961 and 1965, however, 1.3 million new
recipients came on the rolls, doubling the rate of growth. Congress responded by
tightening the work requirements. WIN, among other things, gave states the
option of requiring mothers of children under six (or even under three) to be
"referred" for job training or immediate employment if childcare was available.
Childcare had to meet standards set by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, but, as it turned out, these could be loosely interpreted if necessary.
30
Support for these new measures was not universal. At hearings on the WIN
program, both liberal and conservative social-welfare advocates expressed deep
reservations about proposals for increasing work requirements for women.
Conservative representatives from Catholic Charities objected that the measure
would undermine male leadership of the family, while liberals argued that
compulsory employment was unfair when no jobs were available and criticized
efforts to save money at the expense of the welfare of families, especially
children. Ruth Atkins of the National Council of Negro Women opposed coerced
work and predicted that families would be forced into using poor childcare
arrangements. She pointed to the irony that, under the terms of the bill, a woman
who refused to leave her children in unsatisfactory conditions to enter a training
program could then be labeled an unfit or unsuitable mother and penalized.3'
Countering such arguments, members of Congress replied that there were
safeguards: the work requirement for mothers was discretionary, and states were
prohibited from implementing it without providing adequate childcare.32 Support
for the bill came from both liberal and conservative legislators, both of whom
that he and his colleagues in the Kennedy administration were perhaps overly optimistic about the efficacy of
rehabilitation programs. See ABRAHAM RiBICOFF, AMERICA CAN MAKE IT! 159-60 (1972).
28. See 1962 Hearings, supra note 27, at 416-19 (statement ofElinor Guggenheimer).
29. The bill called for $5 million for childcare for the first year of implementation, $10 million for each
year thereafter, but only $800,000 was appropriated for 1962 due to technicalities; in subsequent years
Congress proved reluctant to appropriate the full authorized amount, allocating only $3 million in 1963 and $2
million in 1964. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 1963, at 137 (1963); CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY ALMANAC 1964, at 183 (1964). The low appropriations undermined the bill's childcare provision
which was, at least theoretically, one of its more positive aspects.
30. New Jersey, for example, set up separate standards for childcare for WIN children. See Monica
Herk, Helping the Hand that Rocks the Cradle (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University)
(on file with Princeton University).
31. See Social Security Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 89th
Cong. 1501-04 (1967).
32. See Herk, supra note 30.
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believed that dire measures were needed to avert a perceived "crisis."
Conservatives claimed that only punitive measures would reduce illegitimacy
and alleged "welfare fraud," while liberals continued to argue that employment
training and work programs would ultimately lead to self-sufficiency and an end
to welfare.
One of the loudest voices on the liberal side was that of Martha Griffiths, a
Democratic Representative from Michigan who saw herself as one of the few
feminists in Congress. Griffiths was convinced that welfare mothers were willing
to work, but she also insisted that in order to succeed, they needed training,
childcare, and access to suitable employment. To welfare recipients, however, it
was not at all obvious that employment was the best or only way out of the
welfare dilemma. This became apparent in an exchange that occurred at hearings
on an Income Maintenance Program in 1968 between Representative Griffiths
and two officers of the newly formed National Welfare Rights Organization
(NWRO), Beulah Sanders and George Wiley:
Mr. WILEY. Our feeling is that a good number, in fact the vast
majority, of the welfare recipients and many of the other people who need
income support legitimately should not be in the labor force because they
have other important responsibilities at home [and have] to take care of
their families.... It is an important question for many people, that they
find jobs. But the important thing is that the men, that the people who are
able to be heads of households or ought to be the legitimate heads of
households be the ones that get those jobs....
Rep. GRIFFITHS: Now, I regret to say, Mr. Wiley, you are speaking
to the most dedicated feminist we have in Congress. I want to point out
to you what I think the welfare program does.... [She goes on to explain
her objection to the Labor Department policy of giving priority for job
placements to the unemployed (namely, men) over welfare mothers.] You
say that this work incentive program will be used to force mothers to
work.... But if you do not say anything about mothers working, then
[the Labor Department and welfare officials are] going to see to it that
none work.... And in my opinion, this is wrong.... [Y]ou are going to
consign the women to welfare. I just do not think that is fair. I am a
woman, Mr. Wiley, and I know the kinds of discriminations that have
been used against women....
[Vol. 9: 123
A Tale of Two States
Mrs. SANDERS: One of the things we are concerned about is being
forced into these non-existing positions which might be going out and
cleaning Mrs. A's kitchen. I am not going to do that because I feel I am
more valuable and can do something else. This is one of the things
people are worrying about, that they are going to be pushed into doing
housework when they can be much more valuable doing something else.
But they do not have the training, they do not have the experience, they
do not have the college degree .... We have children, small children that
we have no day care facilities for. We have nobody to leave our kids with
that we can feel that if we go to work, our kids are going to be taken care
of properly.
33
While Representative Griffiths was no doubt accurate in criticizing the Labor
Department for discrimination against women, her position overall rested on
misplaced optimism about labor force participation and its benefits for women,
particularly where African-Americans were concerned. As Sanders and Wiley
attempted to point out, for black mothers, employment was hardly "liberating"
and in fact usually led to further exploitation and hardship.
Problematic as these bills were, they did contain provisions which, properly
implemented, in theory might have allowed some AFDC recipients to participate
in training and find jobs with the assurance that their children were receiving
adequate care. In practice, however, the WIN program did not deliver. Part of the
problem had to do with erratic administration and funding. Many states dragged
their feet in establishing training programs and were even slower in setting up
the childcare that was necessary before women could be "referred." 34 Even when
services were in place, local welfare officials were often reluctant to refer, for
maternal employment did not sit well with their maternalist/paternalist views of
gender roles.35 The combination of the threat of benefit loss on the one hand and
conservative attitudes on the other left AFDC mothers at mercy of local
authorities. Neither the punitive nor the so-called protective aspects of the 1960s
legislation were conducive to giving these women the choice or the wherewithal
to establish themselves in a labor force that was in any case inhospitable toward
them.
The late 1960s did see some efforts to address women's particular needs in a
more positive-and universal--way. In 1968 and 1969, Congress held its first
hearings on bills to expand and improve childcare programs which were not
coupled to welfare. These bills, which called for federal funding to expand the
supply of day care centers and enhance their educational benefits, ultimately
33. Income Maintenance Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the Joint
Economic Comm., 90th Cong. 77 (1968).
34. See Herk, supra note 30.
35. See Joel F. Handler & Ellen Jane Hollingsworthi Wor Welfare, and the Nixon Reform Proposals,
22 STAN. L. REv. 907 (1970).
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formed the basis for the Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, which
passed both houses of Congress but was vetoed by President Nixon.
The reasons for Nixon's veto are complex. There is considerable evidence
that, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision to require busing to achieve
integration in public schools, there was widespread fear about creating a public
service that would mix the races at an even earlier age.36 This blatantly racist
motivation was, however, masked in Nixon's veto message, which drew on more
acceptable Cold War rhetoric about the need to preserve the American family
and fueled latent conservative opposition to increasing government services. The
conservative mood prevailed throughout the 1970s, barring subsequent efforts to
introduce modified childcare legislation.
By contrast, policies linking childcare to the poor (and thus implicitly
guaranteeing continuing racial segregation) gained momentum. In 1974
Congress passed Title XX of the Social Security Act,3 7 which targeted childcare
to workfare and "at-risk" populations, and in 1975, through the Aid to Day Care
Centers Act, it increased funding in order to raise standards in public day care
centers (while deferring implementation of those standards), and encouraged the
creation of childcare jobs for low-income women.38 Both of these bills had
ambiguous effects on the supply of childcare and its effects on poverty reduction.
Under Title XX, the federal government funded state agencies on a three to one
basis to provide services to low and moderate-income families to "achieve or
maintain economic self-support to prevent, reduce, or eliminate dependency."
39
States were required to dedicate half the services to individuals in welfare-related
categories, but the other fifty percent could go to families earning as much as
115% (states could opt for a lower maximum) of the state median, who would
pay for a service such as childcare on a sliding scale. In practice, most states set
their maximum lower-at or below eighty percent-thus denying benefits to
families who, though above the poverty line, could nonetheless ill afford to pay
the full cost of childcare. This either forced families to place children in cheaper
but probably lower-quality childcare or discouraged them from increasing their
incomes unless the gains were great enough to offset lost eligibility for
subsidized services. In many two-parent families, this served as a disincentive to
wives' employment.40
Title XX also denied parents a choice of childcare provisions. Most states
contracted with specific providers for Title XX slots, usually concentrating on
36. See Kimberly Morgan, Race and the Politics of American Child Care (Feb. 1, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (containing an excellent discussion of the racial aspects of the childcare issue).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397f(1996).
38. See Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 3(f), 88 Stat. 2349, repealed by Act of Aug. 13,
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2353(s), 97 Stat. 874.
39. 42 U.S.C. §1397(1) (1996).
40. In such cases, moving into a higher-paying job would result in either no gain or a loss, depending on
how great the pay increase was in relation to childcare costs. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CHILD CARE
AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN 19-20 (Clearinghouse Pub. No.67, 1981).
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either center-based or family-based care. Families deemed eligible for slots had
to take what was available, regardless of their own preferences as to type. Only a
few states allowed parents to choose freely.41 Low-income mothers who did not
feel comfortable with the available choices-whether they were centers or family
providers-were reluctant to place their children in care. On the other hand, they
could not make use of their preferred type of care if subsidized slots were not
available.42
The Aid to Day Care Centers Act, signed reluctantly by President Ford after
he had vetoed an earlier bill, increased Title XX funding to allow states to
improve childcare services and come into compliance with the Federal
Interagency Day Care Requirements (FIDCR). Implementation of FIDCR, which
had engendered much controversy and resistance from conservatives, had been
postponed several times since the regulations were first introduced in the late
1960s. In the compromise which allowed final passage of the bill,
implementation was postponed once again, though the extra funds remained.
Congress neglected, however, to include a "maintenance of effort clause," with
the result that states simply substituted new money for old, diverting matching
funds previously used for childcare to other social services. Thus the new
funding did little or nothing to expand or improve the supply of childcare.4 a
Title XX-funded childcare was, however, an important component of the
growing federal effort to move welfare mothers into employment. Both the WIN
program, which was specifically targeted at AFDC recipients, and CETA
(Comprehensive Employment and Training Act), which passed in 1973,
permitted a portion of the funds available for support services to be used for
childcare, but left it up to local discretion. Some administrators chose to do so;
others did not, even though regulations barred mothers from entering work or
training if childcare arrangements were not in place. Many administrators relied
on Title XX-funded provisions to take up the slack.
In 1979 CETA regulations were tightened in an effort to compel local
sponsors to provide childcare; the rationale was that without it, women were
denied equal opportunity in the program. Local sponsors, however, took
advantage of the program's inherent flexibility to circumvent these regulations,
either by failing to make provisions, refusing to accept applicants who required
childcare, or, at best, providing only limited services which would be cut off
41. See id. at 20.
42. A study of low-income black families in South Central Los Angeles in the mid-1970s found that
while there was generally a shortage of childcare in the area, many daycare slots went unfilled because they
were not subsidized and parents could not afford them. Parents tended to prefer center-provided care when it
was affordable, but subsidized slots in centers were in short supply. Some high-cost centers with few or no
subsidized slots had to close due to under-enrollment Many family daycare slots went unfilled because parents
preferred centers and also because they were not subsidized. See Karen Hill-Scott, Child Car in the Black
Community, 10 J. BLACK STUD. 78 (1970).
43. See ALFRED J. KAHN & SHELA B. KAMERMAN, CHILD CARE: FACING THE HARD CHOICES 20-22
(1987).
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soon after a mother entered paid employment.44 These mothers were generally
still eligible for Title XX slots, if available, but they often had to compete with
other women who were at an even greater disadvantage--namely, those who
were still in training programs and had not yet gotten jobs.
In the early eighties, already scarce childcare resources for low-income
women shrank still further as a result of cuts by the Reagan administration, and
the quality of these provisions was severely compromised. Under the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation of 1981, Title XX was transformed into a block grant and
funding was cut by twenty percent. Total funding was reduced still further by
elimination of the state matching requirement. At the same time, the amount of
childcare expenses AFDC recipients could deduct was capped at $160 per
month.45 The following year, CETA was replaced by the Job Training
Partnership Act, which authorized less funding for support services, including
childcare. 6 Between 1980 and 1986, these cuts produced major reductions in
almost all categories of federal spending for childcare for low-income families
(see Table 1).
47
Transformation of Title XX into a block grant also eliminated the Federal
Interagency Day Care Requirements (FIDCR) for all childcare providers
receiving Title XX funding. After years of wrangling, these requirements had
finally been put into effect in 1980. Because they had been under discussion for
so long, however, they had already begun to take hold. A 1981 government
report found that most states were, in fact, meeting or close to meeting the
standards for their Title XX facilities. Moreover, private, non-Title XX funded
facilities were also adhering to the standards because they were "emerging as the
preferred norm.' '4
With the elimination of FIDCR, pressure to conform dissipated rapidly. This,
coupled with funding decreases, reduced both the supply and quality of childcare
for low-income families while raising its cost to all consumers. According to a
Children's Defense Fund study of changes between 1981 and 1983, thirty-two
states provided less Title XX childcare in 1983 than in 1981, some cutting more
than the federal expenditure reduction required. 49 In ten states, eligibility for low-
income working families decreased. 50 Twenty states made eligibility more
difficult for low-income mothers in training programs.51 Many low-income
working families were cut from the AFDC rolls, and in a number of states they
44. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 31.
45. See KAH & KAMERMAN, supra note 43, at 19-22.
46. JPTA was also less favorable to women than CETA in terms of its effectiveness in training them for
good (that is, well-paying) jobs. See Sharon L. Harlan, Women and Federal Job Training Policy, in JOB
TRAINING 55, 73-82 (Sharon L. Harlan & Ronnie J. Steinberg eds., 1989).
47. Exceptions were Head Start spending, which increased by about 500/, and the childcare food
program, which nearly doubled. Neither of these, however, affected the supply of affordable childcare.
48. See KAHN & KAMERMAN, supra note 43 at 19-22.




therefore became ineligible for any publicly supported day care.52 Nineteen
states imposed or increased fees for Title XX day care.53 States had to choose
between childcare for children at risk of abuse and childcare for children from
low-income working families. 54 Twenty-four states reduced funds for training
childcare staff, thirty-three lowered their child-care standards, and thirty-two cut
back on the number of staff.55 Ten states shifted from providing childcare
through Title XX to using AFDC's Title IV-A Childcare Disregard program,
which had lower standards and forced poor families to pay more for care.56
Table 1
Federal Expenditures for Childcare,
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As these data indicate, the overall impact of Reagan-era cuts in spending for
public childcare was devastating. For low-income and welfare mothers,
inadequate childcare, coupled with erratic and poorly paying job opportunities
and discrimination in job training programs, meant that it was extremely difficult
to become or remain self-sufficient. This, in turn, caused welfare rolls and
expenditures to swell, leading to Congressional impatience with AFDC. Thus
when the issue of support for childcare again appeared on the federal agenda in
the late 1980s, the situation (and many of the personnel) was similar to that
which prevailed in the early 1970s: On the one hand, there were forces seeking
52. See id.
53. See id. at6.
54. See id
55. See id at 7.
56. See id.
57. KAHN & KAERmAN, supra note 43, at 19 tbl. 1.8 (citations omitted).
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universal provisions, while on the other, there were those who could only
countenance public funding for childcare that was linked to welfare reform.
Until 1991, nearly all other sources of federal support for childcare were in some
way linked to welfare and/or "at-risk" populations.
Lack of federal support for universal childcare has meant that the supply of
public services has failed to keep pace with the growing numbers of women in
the workforce, making it more difficult, not easier, for them to become and
remain self-sufficient. Moreover, though Congress has often revisited the issue of
workfare, it has failed to address endemic and persistent problems such as
ineffective and irrelevant training programs, the shortage of quality childcare, or,
most basic, a shortage of jobs for women paying decent wages. Instead, in a
remarkable display of legislative amnesia, Congress has repeatedly sought to
tighten workfare programs by expanding the class of "eligibles" and increasing
sanctions for those who fail to find jobs. Though the Family Support Act of
1988, which set precise goals for employment participation and granted a great
deal of latitude to the states, failed dramatically, Congress and the President saw
fit to reproduce and expand that model in the recently passed Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.58 This legislation, as is
widely known, makes employment requirements for welfare recipients even
more stringent, using childcare provisions as a bludgeon, not an incentive, in the
process. Policy-makers at every level seem further from condoning universal
childcare than at any point in our history; instead of being an entitlement of
social citizenship for women and an aid to choice regarding employment,
childcare has become part of a harsh program of mandatory labor that places
women, simply by virtue of their status as poor mothers, at the mercy of a
punitive state.
CHILDCARE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The First Phase
Motives for establishing childcare in the private sector appear very different,
at least on the surface. Corporate or employer-supported childcare, in particular,
was and is very much linked to choice; for the most part, it has been created as
an inducement to bring women into the labor force. In this sense-at least at first
glimpse--corporate childcare might be said to enhance women's social
citizenship. I shall return to this claim after looking more closely at the ways in
which corporate childcare has developed and what resources it offers to wage-
earning mothers.
58. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (amending scattered sections of 42 U.S. C.).
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Though the logic of private-sector childcare has, for the most part, been
distinct from that of public-sector policy, there is also conjuncture between the
two sectors at the points where the state has urged or offered incentives to
corporations to take responsibility for offering services that the federal
government was not systematically providing.59 From the 1960s through the
1990s, the number of employer-supported childcare programs has risen from
fewer than 200, serving about 6000 children, to 5600, serving perhaps half a
million youngsters.60 This undertaking expanded the scope of the American
welfare state (broadly conceived to include both public and private social
provision).
Prior to the 1960s, there were a few experiments in employer-sponsored
childcare, the most notable being the Kaiser Child Service Centers established at
the Kaiser Shipyards in Portland, Oregon during World War 11.61 Privately run
but sponsored with government funds, these centers set high standards for
childcare in any era, but they did not, unfortunately, serve as precedents for
future childcare policy, either public or private. The more immediate precedent
for today's employer-supported services can be found in the early 1950s, when
hospitals across the nation, faced with a severe shortage of nurses, began to set
up on-site childcare facilities. Surveys by hospital managers revealed that while
nurses were being trained in adequate numbers, many were lost to the profession
after they married and had children.62 Nursing administrators realized that
motherhood had de facto become an obstacle to further practice because nurses
could not find adequate care for their children.63 The obvious solution was for
hospitals themselves to provide services. 64 Hospital-based childcare, enjoying its
59. See Beth Stevens, Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal Government Has Influenced Welfare
Benefits in the Private Sector, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 123 (Margaret Weir
et al. eds., 1988); Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor in the Truman Era, in THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY 148 (Michael
Lacey ed., 1989); Frank R. Dobbin, The Origins of Private Social Insurance: Public Policy and Fringe
Benefits in America, 1920-1950, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1416 (1992). While Stevens and Lichtenstein emphasize the
role of organized labor in winning fringe benefits, Dobbin stresses the importance of the "policy environment"
(which I take to mean the state). Compare Stevens, supra, at 134-42, and Lichtenstein, supra, with Dobbin,
supra, at 1445-47.
60. These programs include childcare centers, both on and off-site, voucher plans, after-school activities,
and other schemes whose evolution will be discussed below. In 1991, more than 57/ of children younger than
five whose mothers were employed and who were not cared for by a parent during working hours were either
in family childcare homes or childcare centers. The percentages of children in each category were as follows:
32.9% with relatives, 32.3% in childcare centers, 25.1% in family childcare homes, 7.5% with unrelated
caregivers in the home, and 2.2% with "other." Because of the variety, it is difficult to calculate the total
number of children being served at any one time. See CImDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S
CHILDREN YEARBOOK 1995, at 39 (1995).
61. See AMY KESSELMAN, FLEETING OPPORTUNTmES: WOMEN SHIPYARD WORKERS IN PORTLAND AND
VANCOUVER DURING WORLD WAR II AND RECONVERSION, at 74-79 (1990).
62. See Dorothy E. Reese et al., The Inactive Nurse, AM. J. NURSING, Nov. 1964, at 125.
63. There was in general a scarcity of childcare facilities during this period, and there was also a dearth
of regulation and of trained personnel. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, PUB. NO. 246 (1953).
64. Some of the earliest examples were in New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee. See Susan Rimby Leighow,
An "Obligation to Participate": Married Nurses' Labor Force Participation in the 1950s, in NOT JUNE
CLEAVER: WOMEN AND GENDER IN POSTWAR AMERICA, 1945-1960, at 37, 48-49 (Joanne Meyerowitz ed.,
1994).
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"start-up" advantage and sustained by the ongoing need for skilled nurses,
became (and has remained) the predominant form of employer-sponsored care.65
Outside of hospitals, employer-supported childcare programs developed in
two phases. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, they went through an
experimental or exploratory period that fizzled rather quickly. After a brief
hiatus, a more sustained and expansive phase started up in the early 1980s,
continuing to the present.6 A number of major finns were involved in the first
phase, including the Control Data Corporation in Minneapolis, the Polaroid
Corporation in Cambridge, the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company in
Washington, D.C., and the Bell Telephone Company in Chicago.67 It was
estimated that over 400 colleges and universities also offered some form of
childcare.68
While educational institutions gave preference to the children of students
rather than staf commercial firms focused on the needs of female employees, an
increasing proportion of whom were mothers of young children.69 By 1970,
women comprised nearly forty percent of the labor force, twice their number in
1940. Of the 31 million women at work, 12.2 million had children, nearly half of
them under the age of six. 70 Recruitment of women, including mothers, was
especially intense in growth industries such as service, electronics, and light
manufacturing. Once hired, however, these new workers came to be perceived as
problematic. Employers were quick to attribute increases in rates of absenteeism
and turnover to women's difficulties in combining work with domestic
responsibilities.7' In earlier periods, employers had avoided this problem simply
by insisting that potential employees have childcare arrangements well in hand
or by refusing to hire mothers in the first place.72 Now, however, many
employers did not have that choice. In specific economic sectors and geographic
areas, labor shortages compelled employers to hire women no matter what their
family status. But there was also a severe shortage of childcare slots; according
to one survey, existing centers had a capacity for only 625,000 children-slightly
65. By 1977, there were between 150-200 existing employer-supported day care facilities, over half of
them linked to hospitals, health care facilities or non-profit organizations. See David Robison, Working Parents
Choose Home-Based Child Care Arrangements, WORLD OF WORK REP., Feb. 1977, at 13, 20. This trend
continued; a 1984 survey of U.S. companies found that firms in the health care industry had the highest rate of
involvement in providing child care, including the most on-site facilities. See Karen Krett, Maternio, Paternity
and Child Care Policies, PERSONNEL ADMIN., June 1985, at 125, 136.
66. See Sonya Michel, The Corporate Cradle (Nov. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
67. Latest Benefit to Employees-Day Care for their Children, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 11,
1972, at 64, 64-66 [hereinafter Latest Benefit].
68. See id. at 65.
69. Many university-based centers were also used as laboratories for educational research and training.
70. See Latest Benefit, supra note 67, at 64.
71. See id.
72. The 1953 Women's Bureau study found, for example, that employers in Dallas insisted that mothers
make arrangements with relatives or neighbors, not childcare centers, since centers, with their strict health
requirements, would refuse to take children who were sick and would compel mothers to take an absence from
work. See WOMEN's BUREAU, supra note 63, at 78.
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more than ten percent of those with working mothers.73 Like hospital
administrators before them, commercial employers began to see the value of
setting up their own programs.
The federal government offered businesses several different types of aid.
Through Title V-A of the Social Security Act (the "workfare" legislation),
business firms could obtain funds for childcare for employees who were low-
income mothers and those who were welfare recipients. This source was quite
lucrative, for the government matched employer dollars at a three to one ratio.74
One of the best-known projects based on this type of funding was located in
Minneapolis, where a firm called Control Data joined with five other companies
to form Northside Child Development, Inc. The large Northside center gave
preference to employees of the participating companies but also accepted outside
children. With a capacity for 120 children, it became the largest employer-
supported facility in the United States of the early 1970s.
The Northside consortium arose rather serendipitously as the result of a
business projection gone awry. Control Data originally intended to run its own
on-site center, based on executive Gary Lohn's assessment that the reason for
high turnover and absenteeism among his plant's female employees (many of
whom were single heads of households) was lack of childcare. A large center
was planned, but soon after it opened in 1970, a recession in the computer
industry curtailed hiring at Control Data and enrollment at the Center fell to 12
children. Reluctant to abandon the project because it facilitated employment for
a population of chronically low-income female workers, Lohn turned to other
Minneapolis firms and soon found five willing to join a childcare consortium:
Dayton-Hudson Department Store, Lutheran Brotherhood Insurance,
Northwestern Bell, Northwestern States Power, and Pillsbury. The six companies
created a non-profit organization and applied for federal funds. According to one
report, "[b]y August 1971, the center had evolved from a private facility to a
quasi-public one," and enrollment had increased sharply, drawing children from
the local community as well as consortium employees' families. 7'
73. See MARY DUBLIN KEYSERLING, WINDOWS ON DAY CARE 3 (1972), reprinted in Rights of Children,
1972: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
Part 2, 92nd Cong. 569 (1972) [hereinafter Rights of Children].
74. Title IV-A was amended twice in the mid-sixties; the second time, with the institution of the WIN
(Work Incentive) Program, states could require mothers of children under six to find work, provided child care
was available. See Act of Jan. 2, 1968, §204, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 884. Under the Talmadge
Amendment of 1973 (so-called "WIN I"), work requirements were tightened still further, but federal funding
was upped to 90%. See Act of Dec. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-223, 85 Stat. 806; see also Sonya Michel, From
Welfare to Workfare: The Paradigm Shifts of the 1960s (Nov. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
75. Northside Child Care Center Prospers with Business Know-How, WORLD OF WORK REP., Feb.
1977, at 14, 15. The Northside project both reflected and contributed to an overall predisposition toward civic
responsibility on the part of business firms in the Twin Cities that seemed to prevail in the 1970s and 1980s.
"The most important things in this city have happened at the initiative of the business community, not because
of government," Minneapolis mayor Donald M. Fraser told the New York limes. Kathleen Teltsch, Corporate
Aid Helping Twin Cities to Thrive, N.Y TIMEs, July 27, 1981, at Al.
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Employers who were not in a position to hire low-income women, most of
whom were also low-skilled, could take advantage of a tax write-off for childcare
expenses. A landmark 1973 Internal Revenue Service ruling stipulated that the
expense was justified if the purpose of a center or program was "(1) to provide
an employee with a place to send his or her child while at work knowing that the
child is receiving proper care, (2) to reduce absenteeism, increase productivity,
and reduce company training costs, and (3) to reduce employee turnover...
In addition, the Small Business Administration offered loans to cover start-up
costs as well as lease guarantees, and the Department of Agriculture provided
funding for lunches. 7
In the early 1970s, the annual cost of full-time center-based care could run
from $1100 to $2000 per child. Parent fees usually covered only a portion of the
cost, with employers absorbing the rest. In making their calculations, employers
also figured in other expenses. Where there was heavy investment in plant and
equipment as well as tight production schedules, for example, employee turnover
could be very costly. A modest investment in childcare could lower turnover and
increase productivity. Government subsidies could ease the burden
considerably.
78
It should be noted, however, that the way government aid was set up, the
initiative was all on the side of the employer; each firm could decide whether or
not it wanted to create some sort of childcare program-a decision which was, in
turn, based on whether or not it wanted to attract female employees. Businesses
were under no compunction to offer universal care. (At the same time, as noted
above, with the failure of the 1971 Comprehensive Child Development Act,
there was no direct federal support for universal childcare that was not tied to
either welfare or business initiatives.)
What did employer-supported childcare look like? The most visible form was
the on-site childcare center. Often architect-designed, such a facility could serve
as an emblem of corporate enlightenment. Some sponsoring companies operated
their centers directly while others hired outside professionals or contracted with
operators. No matter what the arrangement, company publicity materials touted
their centers' emphasis on children's development, nutrition and health.
Though on-site centers attracted a good deal of attention (due partly to their
novelty, partly to the efforts of corporate public relations departments), they were
76. Rev. Rul. 73-348, 1973-2 C.B. 31; see also Belle Canon, Child Care Where You Work, MS., Apr.
1978, at 85.
77. See WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR DAY CARE PROJECTS 60-72
(1969). During the 1960s different types of funding were also available through the Model Cities program and
the Office of Economic Opportunity. See id. at 15-59.
78. For instance, in 1972, the owner of a million-dollar paper processing plant in Pennsylvania feared
that his new factory would begin to molder unless he could find a dependable labor force, but his low-wage
female workers could not locate affordable child care. His on-site child care center proved so successful in
lowering absenteeism and turnover that he decided he could provide free care for 35 children and still turn a
profit. See Anne Lorimer, For Companies with Day Care, Big Dividends, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 31,
1982, at I-L, 8-L.
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by no means the only or even the most common form of employer-supported
childcare. Other firms preferred to reserve slots for their employees in outside
facilities which they subsidized either individually or as part of a corporate
consortium. Subsidies consisted of expert services (such as accounting) as well
as cash. Many companies believed that while it was incumbent upon them to
support childcare, operating a center, even with trained professionals on staff, lay
outside their realm of expertise. Such companies preferred to take an indirect
approach. This could range from setting up "information and referral" services-
sometimes nothing more than a list of local providers-to arranging for group
discounts at a nearby independent facility.
Some forms of indirect support, like information and referral services or
cooperative arrangements, cost the company little or nothing. Others, however,
might be just as expensive as setting up an on-site facility. Polaroid, for example,
offered childcare vouchers whose value depended on the employee's salary and
total household income, the size of her family, and the cost of the childcare.
Employees could choose where to send their children, but each facility had to be
licensed and company-approved, with certified teachers. According to Polaroid's
community-relations administrator, "We require quality centers-not just baby
warehouses." 79
By the mid-1970s, the initial wave of enthusiasm for employer-supported
services subsided, and management undertook a more sober assessment of its
policies. Few companies turned out to be as committed to childcare as Control
Data, or as flexible and resourceful in finding new ways to pursue their goals
when initial plans fell through. As a result, many on-site programs were
terminated or converted into public services no longer supported by business.
Some small on-site centers, such as the ones run by Stride Rite in Boston and
Connecticut General Life Insurance in Hartford, as well as the Polaroid voucher
program, remained in operation, while Control Data's center continued in its
new, government-subsidized form. As of 1976, it was estimated, the number of
employer-supported programs, including centers, had stabilized at about 150-
200, still serving only about 6000 children. More than half of these programs
were sponsored by hospitals or other health care or non-profit institutions.
80
Despite much fanfare and substantial investment in plant, equipment, and
personnel on the companies' part, many of the new on-site facilities simply
failed to attract substantial numbers of families. Under-utilization not only
disappointed corporate planners but created financial difficulties. While most
companies were willing to subsidize their facilities to a certain extent (often, as
we have seen, with the help of the government), they expected parent fees to pick
up at least part of the expense. Fewer children meant less outside revenue, both
from parents and from the government, and this shortfall, in combination with
79. Latest Benefit, supra note 67, at 66.
80. See Robison, supra note 65, at 13, 20.
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continuing absenteeism and turnover, convinced many employers that
supporting childcare was not cost-effective after all.8'
Some of the resistance might have been predicted, had managers bothered to
conduct inquiries before embarking on their various programs. Most, however,
simply assumed that childcare was what was needed and, without bothering to
assess employee preferences or practices, plunged ahead to create it. At the same
time, employees themselves provided little direct indication of what they wanted.
For one thing, they lacked appropriate channels for expressing their views. The
majority of mothers targeted by first-phase corporate-based services were blue-
collar, clerical, and service workers who, for the most part, were not represented
by unions or were not mobilized in any other way. 2 (The one exception was
clothing and textile workers, whose own union, the Amalgamated Clothing and
Textile Workers' Union (ACTWU), responded to the need for childcare by
setting up its own centers, the first one in Virginia in 1968, followed by others in
Maryland, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.8 3) Second-phase effortswere, as we shall
see, more successful in building an employee clientele, in part because they were
created in response to employee demands, not simply imposed from above.
Indeed, some companies even used complicated "sensing" techniques to
determine what employees actually wanted, thus relieving them of the burden of
making demands on their own behalf (and avoiding possible employee
mobilization).
8 4
All told, by the mid-1970s, employer-supported services could account for
only a tiny proportion of the childcare provisions used by the more than six
million children who had working mothers. Nearly one million were enrolled in
voluntary or commercial (but not employer-sponsored) centers, while the
remainder received care at home or in private family-care settings. In its initial
phase, corporate childcare was hampered by a relatively low level of employer
initiative as well as resistance on the part of its potential clientele. To a certain
degree, corporate policy was determined by state policy, though incentives to
corporations were effective only insofar as they coincided with corporations'
own business objectives-that is, when it was in their interest to hire women.
This was particularly true when it came to tapping the pool of low-income
women targeted by Title IV workfare subsidies.
81. See id.
82. Unions for the most part ignored female workers and/or failed to organize the sectors in which
female workers predominated until the late 70s and early 80s. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE
GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 210 (1990); TERESA AMOTT & JULIE MATrAEI,
RACE, GENDER AND WORK: A MULTICULTURAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 89,
117,130 (1991).
83. See Canon, supra note 76, at 86. As a result of collective bargaining, the ACTWU centers received
partial support from employers. See also REPORT OF A CONSULTATION ON WORKING WOMEN AND DAY CARE
NEEDS 54-56 (1967) (containing an address by Samuel Nocella, International Vice President of the ACTWU).
84. See Jacquelyn McCroskey, Work and Families: What is the Employer ' Responsibility?, 61
PERSONNELJ. 30, 32-33 (1982).
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The Second Phase
The second phase of corporate childcare development, which began in the
late 1970s, was marked by even greater divergence between public-sector and
private-sector policies. While federal policy continued to link childcare provision
with welfare as it sought to move unskilled women from welfare to work,
corporate policy increasingly focused on the needs and demands of upper-level
employees-management and skilled technicians.
This resurgence of corporate interest in childcare had multiple sources. In
part it arose from the women's liberation movement, which more than ever
before framed childcare as a feminist issue and claimed to speak for working
mothers.8 Though the women's movement undoubtedly broke the ice, it was
individual women in high-level positions who ultimately brought the issue home
to employers. By 1980 the efforts of the EEOC were beginning to show results
and the gender profile of the American labor force was changing. Occupational
segregation and the concentration of women in the service sector were declining,
while the proportion of women in the professions, management, and sales was on
the upswing.8 6 According to the Wall Street Journal, "far more career-minded
women have joined the work force, and day-care demand is stronger than
ever. "8 7 Though few women had risen high enough in the corporate ranks to
begin worrying about hitting the "glass ceiling," many felt sufficiently confident
of their market value to seek accommodations such as maternity leave and
childcare without fear of being stigmatized, marginalized, or dismissed outright.
As one Harvard Business School graduate put it to a recruiter from Coming
Glass Works, "What's your company going to do about my two-year-old
daughter?"
88
This woman was not overestimating her worth in the corporate world. In
sectors that were suffering from severe labor shortages, such as high technology,
employers were more than willing to accommodate women's demands. A
spokesman for Wang Laboratories in Lowell, Massachusetts, conceded, "We
have women in highly-skilled positions.... These are one-of-a-kind people.
8 9
To retain such employees, Wang invested $150,000 in its on-site childcare center
in 1981-three-fifths of the program's annual budget. Parent fees made up the
remainder of the cost (twenty-five dollars per week for Wang employees, fifty
85. Feminists addressed many of their demands toward the federal government and also began to
criticize labor unions for failing to take up the issue. According to Muriel Tuteur, director of ACTWU's
Chicago childcare center and a member of the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW), childcare was not a
"gut issue" for male union leaders. "[U]ntil women take hold of that issue," Tuteur told a New York limes
reporter, "we are not going to see a heck of a lot happen." Better Child Care Urged As a Support to Family,
N.Y TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1979, at B1l.
86. GOLDIN, supra note 82, at 74-75.
87. Liz Roman Gallese, Moms and Pops Get Break as Employers Sponsor Day Care, WALL ST. J.,
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dollars for non-Wang personnel). In general, women made the most gains in
personnel-intensive industries, particularly where their talents or skills were
perceived as unique. On-site childcare also continued to be viewed as the best
means of retaining nurses.90
Employers' renewed interest in sponsoring childcare was based on a simple
calculation: It was cheaper to support childcare than to train fresh cohorts of new
employees for high-level managerial and technical positions. In 1979, Union
Fidelity Insurance, a Pennsylvania firm, started an on-site childcare center when
it was threatened with the departure of five key executives who had all become
pregnant simultaneously.91 With training for some positions running as high as
$100,000 per employee, executives readily concluded that it was less expensive
to provide childcare and allow innovations such as flexible hours and job sharing
than to risk turnover by rigidly adhering to work rules and conditions that had
been codified in the days when managers were nearly all male and depended on
non-wage-earning wives to shoulder all family responsibilities.
Some observers attributed the prevalence of enlightened personnel policies to
the ascent into management of veterans of the 1960s, with their more "people-
oriented approach." While benevolence and concern may have motivated some
employers to offer childcare and other family-related services, even more
believed that it was necessary to offer attractive benefits packages in order to
recruit and retain the most desirable personnel. In the competition for
recruitment prizes, however, managers sometimes made serious errors of
judgment and ended up offering benefits that were inappropriate, untenable, or
wasteful. In 1982, childcare consultant Jacquelyn McCroskey cautioned, "far too
many employers make the decision to invest in a family-oriented benefits
program just because someone else is doing it."'92 McCroskey advised companies
to spend time surveying employees' needs and developing a comprehensive
framework through which to relate proposed benefits to overall policies, before
proceeding to the point of actually setting up and offering specific benefits and
services.93
Consultants such as McCroskey were much sought-after during the early
1980s, as companies sought guidance in planning and setting up benefits and
services for their employees. Over 200 representatives of hospitals, government
90. One hospital administrator, for example, concluded that it was less expensive to sponsor child care
than have to recruit nurses on an ongoing basis. "Why should I spend $150,000 advertising throughout the
country for nurses, when I can spend $50,000 underwriting the center to take care of their kidsT" asked Joe
DiLorenzo, administrator of the Park View Hospital in Nashville. Paul B. Brown, Band-Aids by the Boxcar,
FoRBES, Aug. 31, 1981, at 88.
91. See Lorimer, supra note 78, at 1-L. One Boston bank was not so fortunate: in 1982 it lost eight
female vice-presidents who had become pregnant after failing to reach an accommodation with them about
working part-time. This bank's experience prompted other banks in the city to reassess their policy on hours.
See Diane Casselberry Manuel, Business Responds to Family Concerns, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, May 10,
1982, at 17.
92. McCroskey supra note 84, at 30, 33.
93. See id. at 32-33.
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agencies and major corporations flocked to a conference on "New Management
Initiatives for Working Parents" held at Wheelock College in Boston in 1981,
and hundreds more invited consultants, usually accompanied by their research
teams or "groups," to come into their firms, conduct on-site surveys, and then
design customized solutions. Most in demand were consultants who could offer
unique "products" such as "cafeteria-style benefits," an array devised to
compensate employees who would not make use of benefits such as childcare,
which accrued only to the parents of young children.94 Cafeteria plans ensured
faimess across the board by allowing employees to pick and choose among a
range of benefits that might include discount tickets to ball games or
membership in a health club as well as childcare. Consultants could guide
personnel departments through the administrative complexities involved in
setting up such plans.95
Consultants and research groups were only one type of spin-off from the
benefits bonanza. Day care brokers offered to locate "slots" and providers to suit
particular clients, while firms such as "Wheezles and Sneezles" in Minneapolis
specialized in lining up caretakers for sick children on short notice.96 For
companies that still preferred to provide their own, commercial day care vendors
pitched proposals for setting up and operating on-site centers. Such vendors
could oversee every aspect of the service, including design and construction of
the building, curriculum development, menu planning, hiring, training,
supervising personnel, and so on.
By extricating the functions of planning and operating childcare from
corporate personnel divisions, repackaging them, and then marketing them back,
such services allowed companies to reap the benefits of enlightened
employerhood while avoiding the headaches involved in setting up a whole new
operation or division. To companies accustomed to purchasing parts and
equipment (or, closer to home, health insurance and pension plans) from outside
vendors or suppliers, it seemed only logical to contract for childcare. At the same
time the creativity and momentum generated by spin-offs helped to channel and
maintain energy around the idea of corporate childcare, making it more feasible
for employers to "install" as well as more attractive to employees. Employers
were also encouraged by the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act,97 which allowed
employers to accelerate depreciation for the cost of constructing on-site or
nearby childcare facilities. By 1986, the annual value of taxes foregone under
this provision amounted to $110 million. The proliferation of employer-
94. "Employers offering even limited child-care assistance" often received complaints and heard
expressions of resentment from non-parents. Joann S. Lublin, The New Interest in Corporate Day-Care, WALL
ST. J., April 20, 1981, at 18.
95. The 1981 Boston conference devoted a workshop to this subject. See NEW MANAGEMENT
INITLATIVES FOR WORKING PARENTS: REPORTS FROM AN APRiL 1981 CONFERENCE 99-103 (Clifford Baden &
Dana E. Friedman eds., 1981).
96. See Judy Foreman, Working Parents Do Better in Boston, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 1981, at 63.
97. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 129 (1996)).
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supported services, combined with their growing popularity, raised employee
expectations and consolidated a clientele for what appeared to be an expanded,
woman-friendly privatized welfare state.
A Spur to the Private Sector
Even at its height, however, the supply of employer-sponsored childcare was
not adequate to meet the need for services, but other forms of privatized
childcare were also expanding. As with the corporate sector, this component of
the privatized welfare state benefited from governmental incentives, most of
which were directed toward subsidizing demand, not supply. Just as Reagan was
slashing support for childcare for the poor, federal expenditures for childcare for
middle-class families were being markedly increased (see Table 1). Under the
"Dependent Care Assistance Plan" provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act, individuals were permitted to exclude the value of employer-provided
childcare services from their gross income. 98 At the same time, the amount of the
childcare tax credit was increased (mainly to the advantage of lower-income
families) and the Internal Revenue Code was modified to permit taxpayers to
shelter pre-tax dollars for childcare and other personal and dependent care
services in "flexible spending plans" (families had to choose between flexible
spending or the tax credit).99 By 1986, the total value of these foregone taxes had
risen to over $3 billion, more than triple what it had been in 1980, and by far the
federal govemment's greatest single expenditure for childcare.l°°
The nature of these policies-tax cuts for individuals and tax breaks for
employers-were intended to facilitate parent choice and spur childcare
initiatives in the private sector. To a large extent, they appear to have achieved
the desired effect. A sizable increase in the labor force participation rates of
middle-class mothers made such policies especially timely (see Tables 2-4).101
This group of women both needed childcare and was reasonably well positioned
to take advantage of financial assistance in the form of tax credits or flexible
spending accounts, which require advance planning and some flexibility in
household cash flow.
98. Such services were generally offered to mid- or upper-level (middle-class) employees. See 26
U.S.C. § 129 (1996).
99. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9547033, 1995 PRLEXIS 1509; see also KAHN & KANMMAN, supra note 43 at
195-96.
100. See KAHN& KAMERMAN, supra note 43 at 19.
101. Though I realize this is somewhat problematic, I am taking the category "married mothers,
husbands present" as a surrogate for working-class or middle-class families, that is, those families likely to
have a stable income.
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Table 2
Labor Force Participation of Mothers with Young Children
in March 1980 and March 1986, by Marital Status0 2
1980 1986
All mothers with children under six 47% 54%
Married mothers, husband present 45 54
Women heading families alone 55 59
Table 3
Labor Force Participation of Wives with Young Children,
Husbands Present, March of Selected Years, 1970-1985103
1970 1975 1980 1985
With children under 18 39.8% 44.9% 54.3% 61.0%
With children under 6 30.3 36.8 45.3 53.7
With children under 1 24.0 30.8 39.0 49.4
Table 4
Children Under Age 6 by Type of Family and Labor Force Status of Mothers,
March 1980 and March 1986104
Percentage with mother in labor force 1980 1986
All families 43% 51%
Married-couple families 42 51
Families maintained by women 50 54
The relaxation of federal standards also spurred the growth of privatized
childcare, nowhere more than in the for-profit sector. Operators of commercial
centers gravitated toward regions of the country that were underserved by non-
profits and states that had looser regulations. From 1980 to 1985, Kinder-Care,
the largest chain of proprietary childcare centers, more than doubled in size,
expanding from 510 centers serving 53,000 children to 1040 centers with a
capacity for 100,000, while Children's World, the third-largest chain, grew from
84 centers in seven states to 240 centers in thirteen states. 105
102. KAHN & KAERAN, supra note 43, at 11 tbl. 1.4.
103. Seeid attbl.1.5.
104. See id. at 12 tbl.1.6.
105. See WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN? CHILD CARE POUCY FOR THE 1990s 159 (Cheryl D.
Hayes et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN?]; see also Sharon L. Kagan &
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It would be misleading to suggest that only the for-profit sector of the
privatized welfare state expanded during this period; many non-profit childcare
facilities were established as well. Among the sponsors were educational
institutions and voluntary organizations such as the YWCA and the Salvation
Army, which made childcare a national priority, as well as hundreds of local
groups, both independent and affiliated. Churches and synagogues started
childcare centers or converted existing part-day nursery schools into all-day
programs. The availability of these new services facilitated a shift from family-
based to center-based care; between 1958 and 1982 the proportion of families
using childcare centers of all types more than quadrupled.1 °6
Family-based childcare by both relatives and non-relatives increased from
1958 through 1982, but fell off somewhat from 1982 to 1994.107 Throughout
these years, the use of family providers exceeded the use of center-based care,
though the margin shrank over time. In 1982, over forty-six percent of wage-
earning mothers used family-based care (over twenty-five percent by
nonrelatives and almost twenty-one percent by relatives), as opposed to nearly
twenty percent who used center-based care. By 1994, those figures had changed
markedly: only thirty-three percent used family-based care (twenty percent
nonrelatives, thirteen percent relatives), as opposed to twenty-eight percent who
used centers. Much of the shift appears to have been from care by relatives to
center-based care.108 But a core of families continued to prefer family-based care
by non-relatives.
At the same time the proportion of families with employed mothers using in-
home care by non-relatives declined significantly, though it remained an
important source of care for upper middle-class and upper-income families. For
various reasons, many of those in a financial position to do so preferred to avoid
group care situations when possible, though for older preschool children they
often arranged a combination of part-day nursery school and in-home
caregiving. 1°9
As a result of these various arrangements, a multi-tiered system emerged
during the 1980s: publicly funded centers or family caregivers struggling, with
declining resources, to provide childcare for poor and low-income children;
family childcare with a primarily working-class and lower middle-class clientele;
voluntary or proprietary centers for middle-class families; and in-home
caregiving by nonrelatives, supplemented by nursery schools, for the well-to-do.
106. See BARIARA R1 BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 284 (1986).
107. See id.
108. In some instances, relatives who were initially willing to care for kin children branched out to take
in non-kin children, charging fees for services they had previously provided to kin for nothing. See generally
CAROLINE ZINSSER, RAISED IN EAST URBAN: CHILD CARE CHANGES IN A WORKING-CLASS COMMUNITY
(1991).
109. See JULIA WRIGLEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S CHILDREN (1995); ZINSSER, supra note 108.
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Social and Economic Markets
Though providers of all types in the private sector were responding to the
same perception of a critical need for childcare services, their motivations, goals,
and methods, as well as the quality of care offered, differed considerably,
particularly when proprietary and voluntary childcare were compared. Most
observers concurred that, with a few notable exceptions, the level of care in non-
profits generally exceeded that at proprietary centers.' 10 While Children's World
centers were, for example, generally considered high in quality, the majority of
for-profits sought to keep standards low and, if part of a chain, standardized
equipment and curricula to the detriment of accommodating cultural variations
and preferences among clienteles. The profit motive clearly affected the
atmosphere of childcare facilities. While the environments and curricula of
voluntary centers took many forms and shapes, often reflecting the
countercultural tastes of their founders, for-profits maintained a level of quality
that tended to be no better than absolutely required. One study found that, "while
all centers met licensing requirements, none exceeded minimum standards.
Centers were clean and bright, but unimaginative."'
1 '
Whether voluntary, independent for-profits, or chains, all childcare centers
tended to operate with extremely tight budgets. Chains were able to achieve
certain economies of scale in purchasing supplies and equipment and through
multiple construction projects, but this kind of savings was seldom available to
independent centers. The major expense-and therefore the major site for
realizing a profit, if that was the goal-was (and is) in salaries, and this could be
achieved only by maintaining the lowest possible wage scales and caregiver-to-
child ratios the local labor market and the law would allow. According to one
study, in 1982 for-profit centers spent only sixty-three percent of their budgets on
salaries, compared to seventy-three percent spent by non-profits." 2 Another
study in the mid-seventies found that the salary ranges in non-profit centers were
generally about five to ten percent higher than those in for-profit centers, even
though caregiver-to-child ratios were higher in the former than the latter."13
Tumover, not surprisingly, was greater at for-profits than at voluntary centers. To
cover the cost of higher salaries and better staffing ratios and to ensure
continuity, fees at non-profits sometimes ran higher than at commercial facilities.
110. See WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN?., supra note 105, at 160.
111. Kagan & Glennon, supra note 105, at 408 (discussing a study conducted by The Women's
Research Action Project in 1974).
112. See id. at 406.
113. See MARCY WHITEBROOK ET AL., NATIONAL CHILD CARE STAFFING STUDY, WHO CARES? CHILD
CARE TEACHERS AND THE QUALITY OF CARE IN AMERICA 15-16 (1989); KEYSERLING, supra note 73, at 100-
07, reprinted in Rights of Children, supra note 73, at 666-73; WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra
note 105, at 160-61; see also JEFFREY TRAVERS & RICHARD RUOPP, NAIONAL DAY CARE STUDY:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 22 (Sally Weiss ed., 1978) (discussing similar differences
between government-funded and pure parent-fee centers).
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While voluntary childcare centers struggled to offer the best possible care
while still keeping fees as low as possible, proprietary childcare center operators
sought to maintain or, preferably, raise profit margins by keeping standards and
regulation to a minimum, even if this meant (as it inevitably did) compromising
quality. When legislators and children's advocates called for tougher
requirements at both the federal and state levels, the proprietaries rose to
challenge them.' 14 By the early 1980s, the National Association of Childcare
Management (NACCM), with a membership of owners and managers of
proprietary centers, had become "a strong lobby on Capitol Hill.""' 5 Their chief
concern was to block federal standards that would raise either staffing levels or
salary requirements.
Recent research has found a strong relationship between compensation and
levels of childcare. "The most important predictor of the quality of care children
receive, among the adult work environment variables, is staff wages," according
to a 1989 National Childcare Study" 6 The study also found that childcare staff
salaries were "abysmally low" compared to other employees with similar levels
of education and training; that between 1977 and 1988, "staff turnover has
nearly tripled... jumping from 15%... to 41%," and that "children attending
lower-quality centers [i.e. those with lower staff salaries and provider-to-child
ratios] were less competent in language and social development." ' 1 7 While low
salaries are endemic throughout the childcare field, they have, as noted above,
tended to be lower in proprietary than in voluntary childcare centers. Thus
children attending the for-profits during the 1980s were more likely to suffer the
sequelae of their caretakers' poor pay.
Outside the Centers
During this same period, more informal arrangements such as family
childcare and in-home caregiving were also expanding."18 The proportion of
mothers using family care doubled between 1958 and 1982, with the bulk of the
clientele coming from working-class or lower middle-class backgrounds-much
like the providers themselves." 9
It is difficult to document precisely the patterns of growth in this sector of
care because most providers operated independently in a kind of occupational
"gray market.' 120 Somewhat self-effacing, they did not regard themselves as
114. For a discussion of motives from the perspective of the proprietaries, see Ann Muscari, Aims,
Policies, and Standards of For-Profit Child Care, in CARING FOR CHILDREN: CHALLENGE TO AMERICA 233
(Jeffrey S. Lande et al. eds., 1989). Muscari was affiliated with Kinder-Care.
115. Kagan & Glennon, supra note 105, at 410.
116. CHILD CARE EMPLOYEE PROJECT, WHO CARES? CHILD CARE TEACHERS AND THE QuALIT OF
CARE IN AMERICA 4 (1989).
117. Id
118. See BERGMANN, supra note 106, at 275-98.
119. See ZINSSER, supra note 108, at ch. 1.
120. WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN?, supra note 105, at 151-56.
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being professional or even employed in any usual sense. Adopting the identifier
"babysitter" rather than childcare provider or caregiver, the providers saw their
activities as an extension of their domestic duties requiring no particular training
or qualifications other than "a love of children."'121 Some family providers were
young mothers who took in a few extra children in order to afford staying home
with their own offspring while they were young. In their minds, they were merely
"temporary providers" for whom family day care was an expedient. This group
also tended to eschew professionalism with regard to childcare, though they
might not have with regard to an occupation outside the home.
It is also difficult to track family care because only a small proportion of the
providers were licensed. Some were unlicensed because state laws did not
require them to be; others were unlicensed because they did not want to report
their income, their homes did not meet the standards, or they wished to avoid
oversight for other reasons, such as maintaining ethnic or racial homogeneity.
Nevertheless, in the 1970s, several organizations of or for family childcare
providers emerged, attracting those who wished to enhance their own visibility
and status or obtain access to government benefits, such as food assistance, that
might not be available to small-scale providers operating independently.
These informal arrangements should definitely be included in any
conceptualization of the private sector of the welfare state, for they clearly filled
an important gap in childcare, particularly for lower-income families who fell
through the cracks between public provisions and more expensive market-based
services. However, as in other instances, this area of the private sector was not
completely autonomous or separate from the public sector-the state. Through
regulation, however erratic, and through incentives and supports, such as the
food program, the government (at both state and federal levels) encouraged and
sustained the development of family childcare as another form of market-based
services.
While the proportion of families using care in their own homes by either
relatives or nonrelatives has declined since 1958, it is still important for upper-
income families. 122 Many professional and managerial couples choose this type
of arrangement in the belief that it is superior to center or family care. To a great
extent, the federal childcare tax credit underwrites this choice-another example
of the state encouraging the market-in this case, the market for domestic
service workers.
Wage-Earning Mothers in the Public-Private Welfare State
Though both market and nonprofit services constitute a significant part of
the privatized welfare state, it is corporate or employer-sponsored childcare that
121. In some cases the child-care providers' self-effacing stance allows them to avoid the wrath of
spouses who oppose employment for women in general, or for their wives in particular.
122. See BERGMANN, supra note 106, at 275-98.
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has become emblematic of private welfare in the sense that, like health care, it
has become, in at least in some sectors of the economy, part of the "benefit
package" employees expect. Loudly trumpeted by management, corporate
childcare, along with paid maternity and parental leaves, flexible hours, and
other provisions and accommodations for working parents, seems to be taking
the private sector of the American welfare state in a new direction.' 23 But these
phenomena also raise a number of questions about what a privatized welfare
state means for women. On the one hand, employer-sponsored "family-friendly"
policies appear to be a boon to women. But are they? Some observers of the
current scene, such as Arlie Hochschild, have suggested that such innovations--
particularly when they are under corporate control---can colonize women's time
and domestic lives, leading to greater exploitation of both them and their
families. 124 Have workplaces become family-friendly, or have families simply
attuned themselves to the demands and rhythms of the workplace? Further,
attractive benefits lock employees into certain corporations-as indeed they are
intended to do. This is particularly true for a service like childcare; a disgruntled
employee will think twice about moving to another company when it means
wrenching a child from his accustomed teachers and mates.
Whatever the drawbacks of employer-supported benefits for the employees
who use them, we must also consider their status as entitlements to women as a
whole; that is, can private-sector or employer-sponsored provisions enhance
women's social citizenship in general? The two-phase development I have
sketched, with the explosion of employer-supported childcare in the second,
suggests not. Employers were far more likely to provide such benefits when (a)
they were under some form of compulsion from the state to hire women (such as
the Equal Opportunity Act when it was actually being enforced by the EEOC);
(b) they had made a significant investment in recruiting and training female
employees; (c) there was a vacuum in state provision; and (d) there were
substantial state-generated incentives such as supplemental funding or tax write-
offs. Though firms hired many women during the first phase, these employees
tended to be more "disposable," except in industries where substantial ongoing
production costs made turnover of even low-level workers expensive.
Low-income women were doubly vulnerable because childcare supported by
Title IV-A funding was subject to the whims of Washington as well as local
vicissitudes. These funds were, as I have described, sharply reduced during the
Reagan administration. This did not curtail the growth of corporate childcare
during the eighties, however, because the new services were targeted toward a
123. Up until this time, the United States government had generally pursued policies that avoided
endorsing maternal employment, except in times of emergency or war. See MICHEL, supra note 8, (manuscript
at 284-461, on file with author). For a discussion of other aspects of the gender implications of employee
benefits, see Lauri Perman & Beth Stevens, Industrial Segregation and the Gender Distribution of Fringe
Benefits, 3 GENDER& SOC'Y 388 (1989).
124. See Arlie Hochschild, The Cultur of Politics: Traditional, Postmodern, Cold-Modern, and Warm-
Modern Ideals of Care, Soc. POL. 331 (1995); see also Stevens, supra note 59, at 7.
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different cohort of employees who would not, in any case, have been eligible for
Title IV-A funding, but who were benefiting from a new set of state incentives
designed to spur the growth of privatized childcare.
The private side of the welfare state is, however, private, and thus has no
responsibility to act as an equalizing, universalizing, or redistributive force. State
incentives designed to mobilize the private sector-business-for such purposes
will be effective only when they coincide with the interests of business, that is,
when they appear to be cost-effective. Non-clients of the private welfare state,
that is to say, non-employees of corporations offering childcare and other
services, have no purchase in it, no claim to its benefits.
These non-claimants or ineligibles may turn to the marketplace or the
nonprofit sector to find childcare services, but, as noted above, supplies are
erratic, quality varies, and, in the case of commercial centers, profits are often
based on the exploitation of childcare workers. Moreover, most poor and low-
income women are priced out of the market and have no alternative but to
subject themselves to the arbitrary policy directives of the public sector. Here, as
we have seen, childcare is related not to choice or to women's empowerment, but
to racist stereotypes about women's motivation to become mothers and
artificially generated perceptions of welfare crisis. While funds for childcare
have been earmarked under the terms of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,125 there are already indications that
quality services will not be made readily available. As one Ohio state legislator
put it caustically in a recent news interview, "Why should we replace one
entitlement with another?"'
126
Thus in both the private and public sectors-and in the policy space that is
governed by their complicity-women lack control over the social provisions
that govern their lives; neither sector offers the type of unconditional, universal
entitlement to childcare and other family benefits required for social citizenship.
In the private sector, this means that if a certain corporation or industry has no
interest in recruiting or retaining women-if it is under no compulsion to do
so--women cannot gain access to a service such as childcare which is essential
to their ability to enter and compete effectively in the labor force. Women who
do have access to employer-supported benefits run the risk that their privileges
are contingent upon good behavior as well as the financial health of their
sponsors. 127 Women who turn to the nonprofit sector in the hopes of finding
high-quality care for their children must compete for scarce spaces and often
devote a high proportion of their income to fees-a proportion that is seldom
125. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (amending scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
126. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 6, 1997) (statement of Rep. Joan
Lawrence).
127. Even more detached from a potential childcare lobby are parents who hire nannies or other in-home
childcare providers and disdain all forms of group childcare for their children. See generally WRIGLEY, supra
note 109 (discussing the privatization of childcare for upper-income families).
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fully offset by tax write-offs. Women who use commercial services face the same
high costs without the assurance of quality. The public sector may provide
women with free or low-cost care, but at the price of coercion, humiliation, and
uncertainty. Public funding is not guaranteed, and criteria for eligibility change
frequently.
But perhaps the greatest impact of the public-private welfare state is
political; it has created a deeply divided constituency for childcare. Employer-
sponsored services have generated an employee elite that serves to hive off an
articulate and powerful cohort of women (and men) who might otherwise lend
their strength to a lobby for universal childcare and other family provisions
through the nonprivatized sector of the welfare state. Consumers of market,
nonprofit, family, and in-home provisions are equally alienated from the political
process. Usually ideologically committed to the type of care they have chosen,
they are also isolated from one another spatially, socially, and temporally, and
thus are also incapable of joining in to form a solid childcare lobby. Finally, as
the recent welfare debates revealed so tragically, poor and low-income women-
though often mobilized-lack the wherewithal to project their voices effectively
in policy-making arenas and, without assurance of minimal provisions for
themselves, can hardly be expected to push for universal childcare. Because of
the political inertia generated by the public-private welfare state, there is little
hope that childcare provisions will be expanded any time soon, and thus, at the
moment, the prospects for social citizenship for American women appear quite
dim.
(V/ol. 9: 123
